DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 262 479 EA 018 035

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TITLE The Political Bargaining Model--"New" Dimensions.
PUB DATE Apr 85
NOTE 38p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (Chicago, IL, March 31-April 4, 1985).
PUB TYPE Reports - Descriptive (141) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Educational Policy; Elementary Secondary Education; Governance; Lobbying; *Models; *Policy Formation; *Political Influences; Political Power; *Politics of Education; Power Structure; Private School Aid; Social Exchange Theory; State Action; *State Legislation; Tax Credits; Tuition
IDENTIFIERS Minnesota; *Political Bargaining Model

ABSTRACT

Policymaking has been studied from a variety of conceptual perspectives. The political bargaining model, used in conjunction with the broader systems framework, constitutes a familiar approach to research regarding education policymaking at the state level. This paper focuses on the conceptual implications of a study which applied that approach to a longitudinal investigation of the legislative process resulting in Minnesota's tuition tax concession statutes for elementary-secondary education. The findings indicate that the political bargaining model is a valid, productive, but insufficient model because it does not directly address two pervasive features of the process--political language and symbolic action. This paper provides a summary of the Minnesota study, a brief illustration of the utility of the political bargaining model, and a preliminary case for the consideration of categories that direct our attention to the symbolic dimension of state level policymaking. (Author/TE)

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The Political Bargaining Model--"New" Dimensions

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Paper Prepared for the AERA Annual Meeting

April, 1985

EA 018 035

THE PURPOSE

Policymaking has been studied from a variety of conceptual perspectives. The political bargaining model, used in conjunction with the broader systems framework, constitutes a familiar approach to research regarding education policymaking at the state level.[1] This paper focuses on the conceptual implications of a study which applied that approach to a longitudinal investigation of the legislative process resulting in Minnesota's tuition tax concession statutes for elementary-secondary education.[2] The findings indicate that the political bargaining model is a valid, productive, but insufficient model because it does not directly address two pervasive features of the process—political language and symbolic action. This paper provides a summary of the Minnesota study, a brief illustration of the political bargaining model's utility, and a preliminary "case for" the consideration of categories which direct our attention to the symbolic dimension of state level policymaking.

THE MINNESOTA STUDY

The Minnesota study, recently completed, employed a comparative case design to identify, describe, and analyze the political factors which might explain the state's persistent endorsement of tuition tax concession provisions for private school parents. Minnesota was chosen because the state's continued endorsement of tax concession statutes represented a unique policy response. While other states had passed similar measures, their laws did not survive judicial challenge. In Minnesota, however, litigation redirected rather than restrained legislation. Cycles of enactment, adjudication, revision, and reenactment punctuated the 1970's. And, in 1983, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute.[3]

The study focused on actors, processes, and outcomes in three legislative sessions: 1971, 1976, and 1981. Although the initial tax deduction statute

was enacted in 1955, this policy received scant attention and no revision in the Minnesota Legislature until 1971. The 1971 passage of a tax credit, the 1976 increase of the 1955 deduction allowance, and the 1981 retention of this deduction in a climate of state fiscal scarcity encompassed the major tax concession decisions of the 1971-81 decade.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework combined power-influence categories with a systems orientation.[4] The political systems tradition, explicated by Easton, provided a comprehensive overview of the authoritative decisionmaking process.[5] Political systems theory views policymaking as an interactive process through which inputs, including demands for change are converted into outputs, including governmental decisions. Attention is directed toward relationships among system actors at functional stages of policymaking. Although useful as an orienting schema, systems theory is limited in its ability to untangle the dynamics of the conversion process. If influence is the process through which conflicting demands are reconciled and authoritative decisions are reached, then the conceptual framework had to emphasize this phenomenon. A power-influence construct became the primary component of the conceptual framework used in the Minnesota study.

Allison's governmental politics model was the point of departure for two reasons. First, its power-influence emphasis was an appropriate theoretical foundation for the study of legislative decisionmaking. Second, the model had been productively applied to the analysis of issue-specific governmental decisions.[6] This perspective views governmental institutions as arenas in which official and proximate actors possessing different skills, resources, and motivations, promote diverse and conflicting interests through an influence

process based on power and characterized by private exchange and mutual accommodation. The influence process is conditioned and constrained by institutional arrangements, including norms and action channels, and by the broader environmental context.

Influence, in this study, referred to the actor's ability to select, modify, or attain decision benefits. Power was treated as a primitive term and a relational concept, generally defined as the potential of actors to bring about the outcomes they desire.[7] The power of policy actors was seen as contingent upon their control of relevant resources and their skill and will in deploying those resources to obtain influence in the policymaking arena, through inducement, constraint, or persuasion. Following Gamson's distinctions, "inducements" are the "addition of new advantages to the situation or the promise to do so."[8] "Constraints" are the "addition of new disadvantages to the situation or the threat to do so."[9] Persuasion does not provide rewards or punishments. Instead, it involves "some change in the mind of the authorities without adding anything new to their situation."[10]

DATA SOURCES-METHODS

Data sources included official documents, secondary materials, informal interviews, and formal (structured) interviews. Documents were used to establish chronology, identify participants, clarify issues, and assess decision outcomes. Secondary materials provided a description of the environment of the policy system. Thirty-nine informal interviews (conducted between November 1982 and May 1983) amplified the documentary evidence, solicited nominations for the selection of formal interview informants, offered guidance in developing the structured interview guide, and corroborated emergent interpretations of actor roles and relationships.

Thirty three formal interviews (conducted during February, March, and April,1983) generated the principal data. Informants were selected on the basis of five criteria: proximity to the decisionmaking process, potential for diverse perspectives, reputation for knowledge and candor, accessability, and willingness to participate in the research project. Informants were balanced by legislative session, party affiliation, policy position, and issue stance. Informants included former and current legislators (18), legislative staff (2), executive staff (4), interest group representatives (6), and media reporters (3). Three sets of informants (one per legislative session), each consisting of six official and five proximate actors, were chosen. Alternates in each category were designated; five alternates became part of the sample. A structured interview guide was developed and field tested with five persons similar to the formal interview informants. Formal interviews averaged one and one-half hours in length. The face to face interviews (31) were taped and transcribed; for the telephone interviews (2) extensive notes were taken.

Procedures to reduce bias and error included efforts by the interviewer to convey and maintain a neutral position; verbal and written assurances of confidentiality and anonymity; dissemination of a legislative chronology developed from the public record; the use of a structured, sequenced but open-ended interview guide; and the use of probes and "post" interviews.

Data were validated on the basis of position and certainty of sources; clarity, detail, consistency, and plausability of content; ability to corroborate information from multiple sources within the interview method; ability to triangulate information across methods; and ability to verify information from interviewees reflecting different positions and perspectives. The data were organized around the categories of the conceptual framework, then presented

in three individual case narratives and a cross-case comparison. The individual cases were reviewed by colleagues and audited by two study participants, a proximate issue supporter and an official issue opponent.

To array the data that supported, questioned, or contradicted interpretations, statements by informants were extensively quoted with the following codes being used to protect the anonymity of informants:

Leg-S	Legislator-Supporter
Leg-O	Legislator-Opponent
Exec S-S	Executive Staff-Supporter
Exec S-O	Executive Staff-Opponent
Leg S-S	Legislative Staff-Supporter
Leg S-O	Legislative Staff-Opponent
IG Rep-S	Interest Group Representative-Supporter
IG Rep-O	Interest Group Representative-Opponent
M-Rep-U	Media Representative-Undeclared on Issue

The same codes will be used in this paper with one addition, an indication (71,76,81) of the decision focus in the interview.

THE UTILITY OF THE POLITICAL BARGAINING MODEL

In the Minnesota study, the political bargaining model was a valid, productive construct for the exploratory investigation of tuition tax concession decision-making. The model was valid and productive in that it elicited richly detailed descriptions in language which often conformed to the basic terms, categories, and assumptions of this construct. Although the risk of expectational bias was present, participants initiated their explanations of the legislative process through referents which acknowledged the need for negotiated resolution of competing interests, the private nature of bargaining interactions, and the content compromises that emerged as interdependent participants attempted to exert influence in the policymaking arena.

THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF COMPETING INTERESTS

Officials acknowledged that "there is always negotiation going on." (Leg-S,71) Proximate observers also stated, "deals were cut and trades were made...that happens all the time." (IG Rep-S,71) Informants maintained that tax concession proposals were initiated with unspecified dollar requests because "you have to give yourself room to move, to compromise." (Exec S-S,76) Proponents underscored the need for "Sir Galahad moves" to convey "a reasonable, compromising stance on a difficult issue." (IG Rep-S,71) The data complement the findings of many scholars and echo Mitchell's conclusion:

> Bargaining among interested parties is at least as basic to legislative policy formation as any analysis of issues and problems. Legislative policymakers recognize bargaining as a natural and legitimate part of the decision-making process.[11]

THE PRIVATE NATURE OF BARGAINING INTERACTIONS

In all cases, tuition tax concession policy was shaped by informal exchanges among central power players. Key decisions regarding the substance and enactment of tax concession plans in Minnesota were made by interest group representatives and legislative and executive officials during private negotiation sessions which preceded and superceded committee consideration and floor deliberation. The formal decision site proceedings were pro forma actions which legitimated prior agreements. Officials had "done their homework with their colleagues." (Leg-O,71) Bills received "a perfunctory hearing." (Leg-S,76) The "backers lined up the votes long before this thing ever hit the floor." (Leg-S,71) The formal process was characterized as "a side show, a charade, an acting out of a play with the whole thing coming to nothing...decisions were already made." (IG Rep-O,81) The formal process was,in essence, an encore. Again, the data reflect the assumptions of the bargaining model in that conflict adjustments normally occur "backstage where the actors are free to vary their

political role;"[12] where the actors might strike, in Edelman's concise phrase, "a deal not an appeal."[13]

THE RESULTANT CONTENT COMPROMISES OF INTERDEPENDENT POWER PLAYERS

The systematic analysis of bill content provided some support for the contention that policy can be viewed as "a mixture of conflicting preferences and unequal power of various individuals distinct from what any person or group intended."[14] The substance of tax concession legislation did not encompass the distinct demands of any one person or group. Rather, the content mirrored the compromises of "different groups pulling in different directions."[15] A brief summary of actor relationships illustrates this observation.

While a variety of forces converged to facilitate the enactment of tuition tax concessions the critical factor in all cases was the relative power of a well organized, politically active, intensly committed, single-issue interest group alliance composed of the Minnesota Catholic Conference (MCC), an umbrella organization representing the six Catholic dioceses in the state, and the Citizens for Educational Freedom (CEF), a nondenominal organization open to patrons and supporters of private schools. Though the temptation to equate the highly visible with the decisively influential is ever present,[16] informants emphatically maintained that it was the MCC-CEF which gave political leadership, garnered legislative endorsements, and secured decision "wins" when tax concession bills were at stake in the Minnesota Legislature.[17]

In all cases, the MCC-CEF proposals recognized the legislative power of the public school lobby and the judicial clout of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (MCLU). The public school lobby in Minnesota never really mobilized a coordinated, strenuous campaign against tax concession overtures, but the presence of this counter force along with the MCLU's repeated and at times

successful attempts to secure judicial repeal of a variety of nonpublic aid provisions modified the MCC-CEF demands and the MCC-CEF decision benefits.

In all cases, the decision outcomes reflected the trades needed to garner the support of state officials. In 1971, for example, the endorsement of the governor was secured in exchange for a $130 cap on the credit and a commitment of support for the governor's property tax relief-public school finance reform proposal. To obtain the "neutrality" of powerful legislative resisters, proponents had to "tacitly agree" to regulatory requirements. (Leg-S,71) Those entanglements jeopardized the constitutional defensibility of the statute but enhanced its legislative maneuverability. These countervailing forces contained and constrained the scope of tax concession plans, the level of benefits requested, and the level of benefits acquired. The opponents would have preferred no tax concession measures. The advocates wanted more lucrative, less restrictive provisions. The content changes illustrated, then, the accommodations made by interdependent power players operating in an arena requiring the collective resolution of competing priorities.[18]

A CASE FOR "NEW" DIMENSIONS

Although the data attest to the utility of the bargaining model, this construct accounts for only part of what occurred when the Minnesota Legislature dealt with the tax concession issue. It explains the manner in which skilled lobbyists played the insiders game, but it does not encompass the manner in which the MCC-CEF played the outsiders game--based on the mobilization of external resources, the articulation of single-issue demands, and the adoption of an unyielding stance on "moral principles," albeit a compromising stance on material benefits. Tax concessions were typically characterized as a "free standing issue," (Leg-O,76) on which policymakers might "tinker" with the

scope but not tamper with the outcome. (Exec.9-3,71). To analyze this dynamic, different lenses are needed--lenses which direct our attention to the symbolic dimension of the political process--to the role of language (meaning the words and terms used) and symbolic action (meaning formalized, authoritative procedures and expressive, intangible rewards) in that process. Because these categories emerged from an issue-specific, state-specific case study, observations regarding their prominence and potency are necessarily suggestive. Though consistent with related literature, statements regarding their relationship to legislative decisionmaking remain tentative.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

The discussion of "new" dimensions draws heavily on Edelman's efforts to apply a variety of interdisciplinary concepts regarding the symbolic dimension of social interactions to political arenas.[19] Edelman's work highlights six premises which are particularly useful as a basis for interpreting the Minnesota study.

(1) Political systems and the actors involved in them operate instrumentally-to distribute material resources. They also operate symbolically-to arouse and acquiesce mass publics, to create and legitimate perceptions of what is desirable and attainable in the policymaking arena.

(2) The symbols used to transmit and transact diverse demands affect and reflect the attitudes, motivations, and behaviors of policymakers and mass publics. Simply put, symbols are substitutes, designations that one thing stands for another. On one level, a symbol carries no meaning--it is not the thing it represents. On another level, a symbol carries special meaning, ascribed to it by our associations with it. A symbol, then, is a cue which "evokes an attitude, a set of impressions, or a pattern of events associated through time, through space, through logic, or through imagination with the symbol."[20] A symbol sharpens and intensifies some perceptions while it blunts and diffuses other perceptions. In the political arena, symbols "can vividly, potently and pervasively evoke changed worlds in which the remedies for anxieties are clearly perceived and self-serving courses of action are sanctified."[21]

(3) Symbols can be categorized as referential and condensational. Referential symbols have a factual base. They foster a logical, objective, descriptive assessment or interpretation of situations. Condensational symbols have an emotional base. They engender an emotional, subjective, normative response

to situations. Even though symbols can be both condensational and referential, it is possible to differentiate their primary character and their principle effect. While the interpretation of any symbol is contingent on the source, receiver, and context, condensational symbols complement the aim of aroused, acquiescent reactions but counter the objective of critical, integrative deliberations.

(4) Mass publics can be mobilized or mollified through the skillful use of condensational symbols. Mass publics respond to "currently conspicuous political symbols: not to 'facts' and not to moral codes...but to the gestures and speeches that make up the drama of the state."[22]

(5) Officials take on "the roles of the publics whose support they need...to achieve and maintain their positions of leadership," to reassure the vocal and the active that their interests are being represented.[23] Official responses are often token gestures which placate the polity, not substantive actions which resolve the problem.

(6) "The achievement of a political goal by an interested group leads to claims for more of the same kind of benefit and not to contentment. Only through symbolic reassurance that 'the state'recognizes the claims and status of the groups as legitimate is quiescence brought about, and the reassurance must be periodically renewed."[24]

THEORETICAL APPLICATION

The symbolic perspective casts a different light on the tax concession decision dynamic. It goes beyond tax concession statutes as the result of a rather narrow set of accommodations made by central power players. It views tax concession statutes as the result of a series of symbolic interactions evident in an interest group's efforts to arouse and legislators' efforts to acquiesce a mobilized constituency.

The symbolic dimension of policymaking is pervasive and extensive. Virtually every word or act is a gesture in the interchange. This analysis is limited to the symbolic patterns most apparent in the definition of the issue, the conversion and concentration of an interest group's power resources, and the formal treatment of interest group demands.

Condensational Symbols and the Creation of a Salient, Legitimate Issue

The demand for public aid to private schools could take many forms. The decision to portray this demand as a citizen interest, a tax policy, a public service, and a fundamental right illustrates an attempt to use condensational symbols to create a salient, legitimate issue.

Citizen Interest. Tuition tax concession proposals were framed as a citizen rather than a sectarian interest; as a broad based rather than specific denominational concern; as an individual rather than an institutional benefit. In the late 1960's the Minnesota Catholic Conference helped organize the Citizens for Educational Freedom because the MCC's solo efforts to secure nonpublic school aids had been routinely and repeatedly thwarted in the Minnesota Legislature. An informant recalled, "The clergy in their collars could not get it done." (Leg-S,71) Issue proponents reported that the CEF was formed to "discount the Catholic primacy" (IG Rep-S,71) and create a citizen emphasis. The CEF became, then, a mechanism for projecting tax concession proposals as citizen preferences. Proponents explained:

> MCC needed a group that did not carry a Catholic label...It's not exactly subterfuge because the CEF does have people from other religious sectors but 83 percent of the kids were in Catholic schools at that time and we tried to discount that part as much as we could...the CEF needed to take the frontal position. (IG Rep-S,71)

> There were a lot of people who felt that having the Catholic Church outfront on this was not a positive...To put somebody else upfront made sense...We had to recognize that citizen issues had more integrity... Citizen issues could get attention. (IG Rep-S,71).

Tax Policy. Tuition tax concession proposals were presented as tax issues rather than education issues, as policy shifts which could be channeled to tax committees rather than education committees. Informants maintained that proponents wanted to "circumvent the education committees;" (Exec S-S,71) "avoid a confrontation with the public school sympathizers and do an end run

around their education supporters;" (IG Rep-S,71) get the measure "in taxes [where] you have a more sterile decision ...usually you don't want issues in policy committees where people might look at issues beyond cost." (Exec S-O,76) Clearly, there were strategic reasons for defining the demand for nonpublic aids as a demand for revised tax policy.

After the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the tax credit primarily on the grounds that it provided direct subsidies to patrons of private, predominantly sectarian institutions,[25] the proponents chose to reassert their demand for nonpublic aids by resurrecting the 1955 tax deduction statute--one which is "facially neutral" in that its language embraces all parents of elementary and secondary school children, but one which is operationally skewed to benefit private school patrons.[26] As most noted, tax deductions "do the same thing, they give aids to nonpublic schools." (M Rep-U,76) But, a different term provided "a new way around the court cutback." (Leg-O,76)

Public Benefit. Though demands were packaged to diminish the educational ramifications, proponents recognized that those aspects would not disappear. The education consequences were addressed, therefore,in terms of public service as well as private aid.

In 1971, when many public schools in Minnesota were growing and some private schools were closing, nonpublic aids were promoted as economical state investments designed to avert the catastrophic effect of absorbing substantial numbers of private school students in public school settings.[27] Legislators typically stated:

> I remember being told often that private enrollments were declining and public enrollments were growing. The per pupil cost of a tax credit was only a fraction of the per pupil public school costs. If we had to absorb all those kids in the public system we'd be bankrupt. It was sold as a very good bargain." (Leg-S,71)

Newspaper accounts corroborated these perceptual data. The governor claimed:

> Private and parochial schools in Minnesota are facing a fiscal crises of unprecedented scope. No principle is served by closing our eyes to a situation which, if unaltered, may well place very large burdens upon our public school system.[28]

Church officials reinforced that appeal with predictions that 18 Minneapolis-St. Paul Catholic schools would close at the end of 1971. Pleas for tax credits as a measure to prevent these imminent closings and a means to prevent additional, future closings were offered.[29] Revised predictions (indicating that the number of imminent school closings was one half of the original projection) were released the day after the tax credit passed the Minnesota Legislature.[30] Both the content and the timing of these statements illustrate the attempt to portray the demand for private aid as an urgent public need.

In 1981, when public schools were facing sharp enrollment declines and budget cuts, nonpublic aids were promoted as essential public reforms, as "healthy competitive alternatives to the faltering public schools." (Leg-S,81) Over the 1971-81 decade, the definition of tax concessions shifted from measures which preserved the existence of complementary systems to measures which fostered the efficiency of competitive systems. Throughout the decade, however, the definitions carried the connotation of public benefit.

Fundamental Right. Tuition tax concession proposals were cast as moral rights owed by virtue of a just claim,[31] as well as monetary requests, warranted by a demonstrated need. References to "educational freedom" without "economic discrimination"; to "double tax burdens" and "fair tax systems"; to "quality educational service" and "parental choice" were prevalent and recurrent recollections. Consonant, salient value premises, then, shaped the demand for financial aid as a fundamental right and overshadowed the call for material

benefits. Proponents' first priority was "getting the principle established...We could worry about the money part later." (IG Rep-S,71)

It is important to note that the opponents attempted to redefine the issue and that their efforts also incorporated condensational symbols. Opponents maintained that tax concessions were unconstitutional; they "posed a horrible threat" (Leg.-S,71) which would result in "the demise of the public schools." (Leg.-O, 71). Opponents argued that if tax concessions were enacted or extended, there would need to be "regulations" and "controls" on private school systems. But the opponents definitional counters were not easily recalled by informants. Interviewees talked about nonpublic aids with the proponents' vocabulary, perhaps because theirs was the first definition of the issue. "It is the first definition of the issue," Edelman notes, "that most people receive...Once accepted...it becomes self-perpetuating."[32] Moreover, the public school lobby "never really went after the issue" (Leg- S,71) so there were not a lot of competing cues. It was the skillful use of language by proponents which emerged as a striking and distinguishing feature of the influence process.

While words can be both referential and condensational, the language choices most apparent in these data are condensational choices, emotion based terms which equate a specific interest with a shared interest, a concrete action with an absolute value. These terms were also astute choices, likely to carry weight in the Minnesota context for at least four reasons.

First, the symbols had historical precedence and immediate relevance. Cobb and Elder write that "Groups involved in issue controversies may avail themselves of popular symbols that have been used over a long period of time by other groups and other decisionmakers...Such symbols tend to evoke an intense reaction."[33] Clearly, liberty, equity, and justice carry historic affirmation.

Given Minnesota's political traditions-which commend citizen participation in policymaking and embrace government intervention as an appropriate, efficacious gaurantee of egalitarian principles and educational opportunities-these symbols could be particularly salient.[34] In addition to an engrained cultural potency, the language had, what Cobb and Elder term "urgency portent."[35] Specific actions were needed now, given, for instance, the imminent private school closings in the 1970s and the deteriorating public school systems in the 1980s.

Second, the symbols had ambiguity and credibility. That is, they were broad enough to grant many the opportunity to find a cause in the campaign, yet precise enough to be congruent with policy content. Such an arrangement allows and encourages one of the most effective strategies, "emotional appeal under the guise of defining issues."[36]

Third, the symbols fused fervent principle with financial benefit. In the political arena at least, lofty appeals have greater persuasive impact when they are grounded in the economic interests of the proponents. "Practical politicians usually recognize the emptiness of horatory rhetoric that tries to activate interests other than those rooted in the material situation of the audience."[37] In addition, the promise of economic and expressive benefits provided strong incentive for concerted and sustained constituency involvement.[38]

Fourth, the symbols could serve as rallying slogans for the constituents as well as legitimating rationales for the legislators. The slogans for motivating mass publics were present in the overstated policy pronouncements. Educational choice, for example, is contingent on a wide range of factors such as availability of and access to private schools. A tax credit by itself cannot, therefore, guarantee educational choice.[39] But such promises illustrate the kinds of language shortcuts which work quite well with mass publics who tend to "see

and think in terms of stereotypes, personalizations, and oversimplifications, ...they cannot recognize or tolerate ambiguous and complex situations, and...they accordingly respond chiefly to symbols that oversimplify and distort."[40] The rationales for justifying formal actions were apparent in the overarching value statements. Both symbolic functions are important and both could be accommodated.

The definitional strategies did not confuse legislators' perceptions regarding the source of tax concesion demands. Officials recognized that the impetus for the measures came largely from the Catholic Church. Whether these language choices "dulled the critical faculties" of individual decision-makers, whether they became a "series of Pavlovian cues rather than an instrument for reasoning and analysis"[41] is a causal claim about a complex cognition process which cannot be made from the design of this study, especially since referential language was also part of policy interactions. (Technical information on enrollment profiles, operating costs, program contents, and revenue implications was introduced in drafting sessions and testimonial presentations.) What can be said is that contextually weighty condensational symbols were prominent in and associated with an issue consistently described as a "hot," "emotional," "volatile," "wild card" policy on which "arguments don't matter." (IG Rep-O,81) The words of one capture the view of all: "There is not a damn thing that anyone can say that will change a thing...Arguments are irrelevant...The votes are set." (Leg.O,71) Further, these condensational symbols both liscensed and catalyzed the MCC-CEE's most viable power strategy-the mobilization of a mass constituency willing to make tax concessions the determinant of electoral support or electoral retribution.

Condensational Symbols and the Conversion and Concentration of Interest Group Resources

The MCC-CEF had, throughout the decade, impressive though certainly not superior power resources. The MCC-CEF had experienced lobbyists, information and expertise, refined communication networks, sizeable memberships, and established linkages with legislators. So did its most formidible foe, the public school lobby. But resources need to be activated if they are to translate into influence or, as Burns writes, "Power collapses."[42] It is at this critical juncture-the will to mobilize-that condensational symbols appear especially relevant because they constitute a potent, versatile, and effective means to inspire mass publics, synchronize political involvement, and direct political action. Condensational symbols "invite the expression of intense feeling. They draw on beliefs and values that touch the nerves in many people. By their very nature, then, they can be very emotionally arousing, very deeply felt."[43] In the Minnesota context, these symbols fueled the conviction and dedication of the MCC-CEF into what many characterized as "an absolute will to mobilize resources" (ExecS-S,76) and an absolute will to expend those resources on a single-issue item. As an outsider, without interests so vested that they could be protected by reliance on an insider game, the MCC-CEF created a new game, one which altered relative power configurations and official decision calculations by expanding and unifying a target constituency and by adopting and reinforcing an uncompromising stance.

Attracting, Unifying a Target Constituency. The MCC-CEF used condensational symbols to simultaneously enlarge and unify its constituency. Expanding the scope of conflict, adding new players to the game, is an unpredictable strategy. It risks division and distraction, unanticipated and even undesired outcomes.[44] Proponents understood the need to address cohesion as well as attraction in

their pursuit of "potential partisans."[45] They focused on what informants termed a "built in" constituency-the sizeable Catholic church membership-philisophically agreed on many issues including nonpublic aids. Informants reported:

> There are a lot of Catholics in this state, especially in the Twin Cities area. The MCC can tap right into that. They are very unified in everything they do and they are able to marshall all of their strength for every effort. (Leg-S,71)

Educational freedom became a symbol for attracting and solidifying additiqnal supporters. The CEF's membership overlapped with but was not restricted to affiliation with the Catholic Church. It's singular definition of purpose provided a compelling appeal and a coalescing focus. Open to persons "willing to be ceaseless in their efforts to protect and preserve freedom of choice in education"[46] the CEF became, as one vividly explained:

> the epitomy of a one issue organization, and that issue is that parents have the prior right and responsibility to make choices at the elementary and secondary levels and not suffer economic discrimination when they make that choice...If it doesn't fall in that purview, we don't deal with it...It keeps us from flailing out against something that would divide us. Our simplicity is our strength. (IG Rep-S,71)

Tax benefit and tax equity became themes of billboard campaigns and community meetings which "helped the voters from the boonies get excited and conscious." (IG Rep-S,71) Press releases in church publications, CEF newsletters, and metropolitan papers conveyed the urgent need to aid nonpublic schools so that private school closings might be avoided-in the 1970s, so that public school outcomes might be improved-in the 1980s. After the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the tax credit statute, tax deduction provisions became a vehicle to "right a wrong," to reclaim what the Legislature had previously authorized. There was again, "a principle at stake." (IG Rep-S,76)

This virtual bastion of condensational symbols was used to create a zealous identification with and commitment to "a cause." (M Rep-U,71) Informants

aptly noted, "they were mobilized for goodness and that keeps people together." (IG Rep-O,71) While there were signs of splintering groups within the private school alliance in the 1981 session, it was still described as "a very powerful force that comes on with a united front"; (M Rep-U,81) "a well organized, committed, intense group...almost unbeatable in this state;" (IG Rep-O,81) "they believe they are morally right. There is no doubt in their minds...and they were ready to go after it all over again." (IG Rep-O,81)

Condensational symbols were also used to accentuate the mobilized constituency so that its power could be concentrated on the nonpublic aids issue. Emotive appeals merged with explicit directives to generate a strategically focused involvement in the legislative process. Though public rhetoric was quite positive and policy oriented, church rhetoric was more poignant and personally punitive. Informants alluded to activities which define the opposition as the enemy. They reported that "the word gets out in the pulpits, at church dinners" (Exec S-O,71) and "you get known as friend or foe;" (Leg-S,76) the issue is "on the parish pipeline"(IG Rep-O,81) where resistence risks getting "labeled" as an "anti" on the "lists" and "that's a reputation that can beat you." (Leg-S,71)

Adopting, Reinforcing an Uncompromising Stance. Though scholars question the liklihood that interest group members will suppress competing concerns and adopt a single-issue stance,[47] there was little doubt in the Minnesota data. The MCC-CEF was emotionally and logistically prepared to make a candidate's position on nonpublic aids the "moral litmus test"[48] of electoral support or retribution. Ballot box threats were made; pre-session promises were sought. Informants reflecting diverse perspectives and different positions across all cases catalogued tuition tax concessions as a "disqualifying" issue,[49]

one on which a negative stand provided sufficient reason to vote against a candidate irrespective of his or her record on other policy matters. Select but representative statements illustrate that in 1970:

> Many of us were asked to respond to questionnaires and to attend meetings with that single issue in mind. Those of us who were opposed were challenged severely. Their people spoke out: 'we'll beat you if you vote against our bill.' And it didn't matter if you had done 5000 other things right... That gave me and a lot of other people real concern...and it was, I think, a statewide effort. (Leg-O,71)

> People were going around making that an issue in the campaigns and they were choosing sides on who would vote for it. It was not a partisan issue...There was a large-scale effort to get legislators who were running for office to promise to vote for it in the campaigns, and to know they'd face a hell of a fight if they wouldn't make the promise. (M Rep-U,71)

> I don't like to say this...but I think I have to. People really were intimidated. I was. Others told me they were too. Ballot box threats were made..and those are believed...A single issue minority can beat you...That's real for a lot of us. (Leg-O,71)

> It comes down to raw survival. You have to vote the right way. There is nothing else to do...and there is nobody out there that can help you. The minority of people supporting those positions is so powerful and so threatening...(Leg-S,71)

In 1976 and 1981:

> You have to pre-commit...There is nothing else you can do if you want to get or stay elected...You stand in those church basements all alone. There is nothing else you can do. (Leg-S,76)

> Legislators have--on issues like this—committed themselves before the session ever starts. And nothing anybody says can change that promise... and they watch to be sure you keep your word. (Leg-O,76)

> Some vote for it though they are not personally in favor of it. There is so much pressure from constituents, and they can decide to go after you and beat you. There is a lot of pressure to vote the right way. (Leg-S,76)

> You can't get caught out there on an issue like this...You have to join the rush for it. Survival is important, and this is a very emotional issue, a very strong issue. (Leg-S,76)

> They circulate questionnaires during the campaign and they get the candidate's position and distribute that to their members and then you hear from them. They pin you down early...You can't dodge them. They keep at it. (Leg-S,81)

> They start early and they line everybody up. They preach politics and send stuff out on Sunday morning...They are very directive and very active. And, I think, legislators are damn afraid to go against that kind of organization. They make promises because they have to. (IG Rep-O,81)

> The churches get real involved and they have a record of involvment so legislators do what they have to do even before the session starts. If you don't you get labeled and they can muster a lot of vote power, so most people don't take chances with them. They promise. (Exec.S-O,81)

> [MCC-CEF] is a group you can't ignore without alienating a lot of people and risking your own defeat. Nobody is serious about beating their bills. (Leg-O,81)

The Minnesota case richly illustrates the willingness of an emotionally aroused constiuency to subordinate other interests to the imposition of constaints on behalf of a single, salient priority. Constituency responses were clearly intense and focused. Several factors may account for this singleminded determination. First, the symbols surrounding the tax concession issue addressed the need to attract, solidify, and direct the MCC-CEF constituents. The symbols could inspire, coalesce, and orchestrate citizen involvement in the legislative process. Second, the symbols were transmitted to constituents by recognized sources in reputed positions and respected settings, conditions which reinforce the evocative impact of condensational messages.[50] Third, the symbols tapped religious convictions and cultural values, ideological bases which "can turn listeners into believers and believers into actors."[51] Thus, the Minnesota case provides empirical support for the conclusion:

> Condensational symbols may well produce such intense feelings that their partisans are willing to subordinate other issues and loyalties to the achievement of that deeply held goal...no hedging, no compromises, no allowances for a political leader's other commitments or qualities, no alliances with groups concerned about other matters.[52]

Altering Relative Power Configurations, Decision Calculations. Given the MCC-CEF's capacity to convert and concentrate its resources, it is not surprising that on this issue, the MCC-CEF was perceived to hold the relative

power advantage. Although the public school lobby had impressive, perhaps superior power resources, it was fragmented--with sharp divisions between the teacher organizations on one hand and the school board and administrator organizations on the other. The public school lobby had a range of policy initiatives which required constant attention and substantial investment. Embracing such multiple and diverse concerns as foundation aids, employer-employee relationships, and teacher accountability, it could not focus on just one issue. Nor could it risk alienating the legislative and executive officials who endorsed private school aids and well as public school needs. Besides, as an entrenched group, this lobby had influential sympathizers in position to limit the level of concessions. The courts offered the prospect of overturning the statutes. From a resource management perspective, it was not sensible to mobilize a strong counter movement.

Moreover, the public school lobby was "caught napping." (IG Rep-O,71) "They had to play catch-up." (Leg-S,71) All informants observed that the Public school lobby was "beat before they got started...too many people had had to promise." (M Rep-U,71) Indeed, "the handwriting was on the wall." (Leg-S,81) The public school lobby would not expend major resources, it would not "call in the chits" to escalate a losing battle. Since power is relative, contingent on what others do simultaneously and subsequently, the absence of stringent opposition on the part of the most potent countervailing interest group alliance redounded to the comparative advantage of the MCC-CEF. The power configuration resembled that described by Kirst and Sommers wherein a group with inferior power resources can "reach optimal effectiveness and outmaneuver the larger associations" by narrowing its policy interests and concentrating on its "special focus," thus securing substantial influence.[53]

Given the MCC-CEF's capacity to create a disqualifying issue, it is not surprising that many legislators chose to follow the conventional axiom:

> Do as little as you can about emotional political issues...Those who win are forgetful...Those who lose will remember you! They will mush through five feet of snow to get to the polling place, they will get an absentee ballot to vote against you if they have to leave town, and they will publicize your dereliction of duty to all who will listen. [54]

Some legislators were content to let colleagues "get the safegaurds in...keep it in bounds." (Leg-O,71) Some were "willing to let the courts handle it." (Leg-S,71) Officials who were opposed could cast an expedient ballot, but not necessarily a binding ballot. As one reasoned, "Why fight what the court will fight for you? It's easy enough to make enemies. Why aggravate when you don't have to?" (Leg-O,71) Some resisted, and undoubtedly others, caught between the dictates of conscience and the demands of constituents, hoped tax concession bills would be buried in committee, delayed in the session, or somehow finessed by leadership.[55] But the power of the MCC-CEF made it impossible to evade the issue. Indeed, "those who are potentially able and willing to apply political sanctions constitute the politically significant group."[56] And the MCC-CEF had made its ability and willingness to apply the most potent sanction of all—election defeat—explicitly and repeatedly apparent. The if-then contingency was unmistakably clear. That contingency was reiterated by demonstrations of constituency size, strength, and tenacity—packed hearings, rallys in the rotunda and "blizzard" mail campaigns in 1971, less flamboyant but still constant calls, letters, and capital visits throughout the decade. There were vivid, ongoing reminders that as proponents put it, "We were not a disease that would go away." (Leg-S,71) Such demonstrations add believe-ability to prior verbal appeals,[59] and create their own symbolic show of force. Numbers count in a democratic polity and the atmosphere generated also counts.

As Bardach observes,"in almost any political system intensity of feeling counts, and the more intensly an interest cares about something, the more seriously it is heeded."[60] While some literature questions the capacity of ballot box threats to alter the decision calculations of officials,[61] the candid, non-normative,[62] recurrent theme in the Minnesota data was that opposition carried costly political consequences. Only the "very courageous," or the risk taking, or those from "safe" districts were seen as likely to withstand the persistent, personalized pressure. The interview transcripts reveal that for many, issue disagreement carried the connotation of electoral defeat. The MCC-CEF had the organizational capacity and conviction needed to portray itself as a group "pointing a loaded gun."[63] And passage of the tax concession statutes was not a matter of consideration as much as it was a "foregone conclusion." (Leg-S,76)

Condensational symbols were an integral part of the MCC-CEF's mobilization of a target constituency and the officials' decision to make pre-session commitments to the publics whose support was perceived as necessary to secure and maintain their elected position. Condensational symbols were also an integral feature of the Minnesota Legislature's formal treatment of constituency demands. The legislature responded to an aroused public with symbolic actions, token gestures designed to placate contending groups. And as one might expect, the token gestures appeared to legitimate and perpetuate tax concession demands. The achievement of MCC-CEF goals led to claims for more of the same kind of benefit. The signs of reassurance and the signs of recognition had to be repeatedly affirmed, periodically renewed.

Condensational Symbols and the Formal Treatment of Constituency Demands

The Minnesota Legislature afforded tax concession proposals agenda status, procedural recognition, and decision benefits. A review of these actions

illustrates their acquiescing character, their reinforcing effect.

Agenda Status. The MCC-CEF, like any interest group, had to have influential lawmakers aligned with it to secure access to the legislative arena. In all cases, the MCC-CEF bills were carried by respected legislators. In the 1971 and 1976 cases, the bills were also backed by the governor. Undoubtedly these linkages augmented the power of the MCC-CEF. The active participation of officials legitimated the concern to other lawmakers, afforded visibility with broader publics, and allowed movement through the formal decisionmaking channels. But these linkages were both prompted, and in some instances necessitated, by the capacity of the MCC-CEF to create a volatile, citizen-backed issue, by the need to placate an aroused constituency. While informants acknowledged that officials were receptive to tax concession proposals on the basis of policy merit and personal preference, they also maintained:

> Legislators do not raise this kind of controversial, emotional issue in a vacuum. They may agree with it, or be sympathetic to it, but the impetus comes from outside the legislature. (Leg-O,71)
>
> Legislators reflect their constituents. They aren't stupid. They want to stay in office.(Leg-O,71)
>
> These guys have to carry this legislation. Their constituencies would insist on it.(Leg-O,81)

Sources close to the governor reported:

> [The tax credit was] a minor cost to pay to cement his relationship with this potent constituency...[the governor] often remarked that when you delivered for that constituency, they delivered for you. (Leg-S,76)
>
> [the governor] was a Scandinavian Protestant. The bulk of the DFL [Democratic Farmer Labor Party] vote in Minnesota is not Scandinavian Protestaant. It is Catholic. This was one way to pay attention to a principal constituency. Exec S-S,71)

The MCC-CEF had defined tax concessions as a legitimate legislative concern and a potent political demand—difficult to ignore and difficult to oppose. The definitional strategies generated substantial and intense support. In

the Minnesota case, as in other instances,[64] the symbols associated with an issue played "a critical role" in the acquisition of agenda status, in the decision to assuage an active public.[65]

Procedural Recognition. Tax concession bills were the subject of extensive testimony, committee attention, and in 1971, dramatic full floor debate. As previously noted, informants viewed these activities as basically ritual activities. They carried the connotation of rational analysis and substantive deliberation, but they were not perceived as activies which could alter the views or the votes of officials. Rather, they were described as ceremonial actions through which groups might make their power apparent and their justifications known. For the proponents, it was an occasion to present legitimating arguments, demonstrate the size and the intensity of their constituency base, create an "atmosphere" and "add a little punch to the private promises. It's pretty hard for people to go against what they've agreed to in private if you are sitting right there watching them." (IG Rep-S,71) For the opponents, it was an occasion to publicly denounce but not significantly affect the policy outcomes. As one put it:

> We bestirred ourselves to walk to the Capitol to give testimony. We felt duty bound to do it but we were not enthusiastic in any sense...It's not like other issues...You make the pitch for the record but you don't sway anybody. (IG Rep-O,81)

Though resisters could "deliver a real William Jennings Bryan oration," such events, "sound nice and give you good quotes for the newspaper. They don't affect the outcome." (M Rep-U,71)

Decision Benefits. In all cases, the MCC-CEF was perceived to be "the winner" in the legislative arena. But the victory was typically described more as a symbolic than a substantive achievement. Tax concession appropriations were modest in scope. In 1971, the governor and legislators with stalwart

public school lobby loyalties and credible power bases had capped and contained the credit at $100. This appropriation did not constitute a major shift in state revenues. The governor's property tax relief-public school reform package provided massive increases in funding for the public schools while the tax credit statute authorized a minor increase in funding for the private schools. The problem of declining private school enrollments was not successfully resolved. In fact, the first year the tax credit was operative, the Catholic schools experienced the most dramatic enrollment drop ever. The tax credit statute was characterized as a "small price to pay" (Exec S-S,71) for the quiescence of an aroused constituency; a "way to do as little as possible" without risking the "political consequences of outright opposition." (Exec S-O,71)

In 1976, the deduction increases were seen as a "way to give everybody a little rub" (Leg-S,76) with a "small potatoes bill." (Leg-S,76) In the light of munificent revenue surpluses,[66] "it didn't amount to a 'didly' on the dollar side." (Leg-O,76) Though informants expressed concern about the regressive nature of tax deduction provisions, they perceived passage of the increased deduction to be a step which "quiets everybody down for a while." (Leg-S,76)

Again in 1981, the retention of the existing deduction allowance in a time of budget cuts was viewed as a sign of reassurance. Minnesota faced severe financial problems in 1981.[67] In that circumstance, "holding your own is a win...It would have been very unpopular to take the deduction away, but it was acceptable to hold it where it was." (Leg-S,81) It would have been "risky as hell to take money away, but in light of the economics, it was pretty safe to stall them off." (Leg-S,81)

The official enactments were, then, basically token responses to the MCC-CEF, responses which affirmed salient principles but allocated inconsequential

revenues. The pattern of events is consistent with Edelman's observation that decision benefits may be primarily symbolic and that such responses rarely lead to contentment.[68] The tax concession issue was on the legislative agenda year after year, session after session. Whether that persistence was a result of the legislature's placating response is difficult to determine. Cause and consequence are complex phenomenon. The perceptual data imply a causal relationship. Proponents noted, for example, that after the MCC-CEF, in 1969, redefined the transportation aid request as a "fair bus bill," mobilized constituency pressure on its behalf, and secured adoption by the Minnesota Legislature, the organization was "intoxicated by success." (IG Rep-S,71)

> That victory gave us all a new head of steam...it's an issue where you could talk about a lot of little Catholic kids standing out in a snowstorm... its an issue that corrected a wrong...if we hadn't had that, I'm not sure we would have dared to go. The tax credit is a lot stickier issue. (IG Rep-S,71)

Informants observed that after the tax credit was enacted:

> The issue returns constantly...You can't get away from it. (Leg-S,76)

> They just keep coming at you...They never give up. There is always something in the wind and there is always somebody there to see you about it. (Leg-O,76)

The sequence of events in Minnesota suggests that the placating response of the legislature did not result in satisfaction. Rather it was followed by repeated requests for moral and material reassurance.

LIMITATIONS-IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of this paper was to highlight features of the Minnesota decision dynamic which were uncovered by but not explained by the categories and the assumptions of the political bargaining model. The premises of the symbolic perspective are vividly illustrated in the Minnesota data. Condensational symbols were used to create a salient, legitimate issue; convert and concentrate

interest group resources on behalf of that issue; frame a formal response that might pacify contending groups and protect elected officials.

The analysis does not establish that the symbolic construct provides a complete account of the legislative process. A variety of forces converged to facilitate the enactment of tax concession statutes; a variety of factors contributed to the MCC-CEF's ability to mobilize constituency pressure and translate that pressure into influence in the policymaking arena;[69] a variety of factors conditioned the use, let alone the impact, of evocative language and symbolic action on the legislative process. Moreover, proponents acknowledged that the arousal of a target constituency and the adoption of an ultimatum position had limitations. They noted, for example, that "you can't run in high gear all the time." (IG Rep-S,76) Such efforts can "burn out" as well as "fire up" constituents. Failure to achieve or exceed prior levels of intensity may result in perceptions that the aroused constituency has lost its potency, its capacity to insist on formal recognition and decisional reassurance. The strategy can "turn off" legislators, and "bring on" the active resistence of formidible contending groups. Legislators also maintained that while they did not want to "put their feet to the fire," (Leg-S,81) continuous appeasement may not keep either the MCC-CEF or the public school lobby in check.

The analysis does not establish that the symbolic construct is superior to the bargaining model. Each captured a part of the dynamic. Neither captured the "whole" dynamic. Central actors were engaged in private negotiations, in informal bargaining sessions. But the prevalence of condensational language and symbolic action signaled a different style of play as well. The MCC-CEF did not rely solely, even primarily, on techniques of accommodation among established interests. The interplay of power was marked by an appeal as

well as a deal, an uncompromising stance on principle as well as a compromising stance on payment, a ritual treatment rather than a deliberative assessment of policy ramifications, a symbolic affirmation as well as a material allocation, an external, coercive push for compliance as well as an internal, collegial push for conciliation.

This different style of play is becoming more pronounced as increasing numbers of contemporary interest groups seek and secure a single-minded devotion to a single-salient issue.[70] While these groups may give voice and visibility to public concerns, they also change and challenge the policy process. The proliferation of single-issue groups diminishes prospects for the formation of integrative coalitions and comprehensive legislation. As these passionate groups infuse the policy system divisiveness increases among participants, deliberation may be pre-empted, compromises are harder to reach, and stability becomes problematic. It seems then, both appropriate and prudent, to investigate policymaking with models which might help clarify the competing styles of play-the outsider-appeal as well as the insider-deal. Attention to the role of language and symbolic action may assist in that venture. The premises derived from Edelman's work and the concepts developed by scholars who have applied those insights provide a point of departure. The Minnesota study and other case investigations provide a base for verification. Perhaps further work can provide a means of integration. At this point, political language, analyzed in terms of:

(1) its properties: condensational v. referential

(2) its use in the exercise of power: contextually congruent, continuously reinforced choices which carry historical precedence and urgency portent, fuse emotional and logical appeals, promise material and expressive rewards,

merge rallying slogans and legitimating rationales, address cohesion as well as attraction, direction as well as motivation, and,

(3) its impact: on the acquisition of agenda status, procedural recognition, and decisional affirmation warrants further investigation.

Likewise, symbolic action, analyzed in terms of:

(1) its formal components: ritual v. deliberative procedures and expressive v. material benefits, and,

(2) its impact: on the analytic basis of policy decisions, the acquiescence of contending groups, and the perpetuation of extended demands merits further study.

An interest group's reliance on condensational symbols alters the bargaining process. It shifts the power base from internal to external resources. It shrinks the currency for exchange from multiple to single agenda items. It adjusts the will to negotiate by imposing ultimatums on principle albeit compromises on payment. This approach constrains the institutional bargaining process. Research regarding to what extent, to what effect, and under what conditions is needed.

A comprehensive theory of political causation, as Peterson wisely argues, is " a remarkable achievement likely to escape the wit of social scientists for some time to come."[71] A revised version of partial models is a fruitful task likely to consume the energy of political researchers in the interim. This paper suggests that the bargaining model, set in the broader systems framework, is a productive approach to the study of legislative decisionmaking. It also suggests that when particular kinds of issues are at stake, an analysis of the role of political language and symbolic action can be a useful complement, a necessary addition.[72]

Footnotes

[1] See, for example, Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., State Policy Making for the Public Schools (McCutcheon, 1976) pp. 5-13.

[2] Betty Malen (Anderson), "Politics of Persistence: The Legislative Process Resulting in Minnesota's Tuition Tax Concession Statutes for Elementary-Secondary Education" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, December, 1983).

[3] Mueller v. Allen 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).

[4] For a discussion of their complimentary features, see Rosabeth Moss Kanter, "Symbolic Interactionism and Politics in Systemic Perspective" in Andrew Effrat (ed.), Perspectives in Political Sociology (Bobbs Merrill, 1973) pp. 78-80.

[5] David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Prentice-Hall, 1965).

[6] Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 144-244.

[7] The definition of "influence" follows that in Terry N. Clark, "The Concept of Power" in Terry Clark (ed), Community Structure and Decision Making (Chandler, 1968), p. 46. "Political influence" conforms to Dahl's definition as "influence over the policies, rules, and decisions enforced by government." See, Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis Fourth Edition (Prentice Hall, 1984), p. 51. The distinction between "influence" (the actual exercise) and "power" (the potential) is made by several authors, including Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organization (John Wiley, 1966), pp. 218-222.

[8] William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent, (Dorsey, 1968), p. 77.

[9] Ibid., p. 75.

[10] Ibid., p. 79.

[11] Douglas E. Mitchell, Shaping Legislative Decisions (D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1981), p. 56.

[12] Peter M. Hall, "A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis of Politics," in Andrew Effrat (ed), Perspectives in Political Sociology (Bobbs Merrill, 1972), p. 50.

[13] Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 146.

[14] Allison, op. cit. p. 145.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Several discuss this temptation. See, Paul E. Peterson and Barry G. Rabe, "The Role of Interest Groups in the Formation of Educational Policy: Past Practice and Future Trends," Teachers College Record, (Spring, 1983), pp. 708-729 and Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations (Pitman, 1981), pp. 44-47.

[17] Only the 1971 case study produced divergent assessments. Of the nineteen persons (formal and informal) interviewed, two said the explanation for tax credit legislation was the "absence of strong opposition"; two others said the governor's support was "the key." These rival explanations are analyzed in Malen (Anderson), op.cit, pp. 163-166.

[18] The detailed case studies are reported in Malen (Anderson), op. cit., pp. 103-266.

[19] In addition to Edelman, 1964, op. cit., see Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action (Markham, 1971), and Political Language (Academic Press, 1977).

[20] Edelman, 1964, op.cit., p. 6.

[21] Edelman, 1971, op. cit., p. 71.

[22] Edelman, 1964, op. cit., p. 172.

[23] Ibid., p. 188

[24] Ibid., p. 193.

[25] Minnesota Civil Liberties Union et al. v. State of Minnesota et. al. 302 Minn 216, 224 N. W. 2d 344 (1974).

[26] The Minnesota statute made tax deductions available to all parents of elementary-secondary school children for the costs of tuition, transportation, and textbooks. In Mueller v. Allen, Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, declared that the Supreme Court would be "loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law." Still, according to 1980 data, fewer than 100 public school students pay tuition in Minnesota compared with 91,000 enrolled in tuition charging private schools. Further, the Minnesota Legislature's decision in 1978, to exclude drivers education and extracurricular activity costs from deductible items, also restricts public school parents' access to the benefits of the statute. See, Minnesota Statutes 1978, Chapter 766.

[27] The State of Minnesota Department of Education Reports indicated that private school enrollments in the state peaked in 1964-65 at 173,585 students. Between 1964-65 and 1974-75, enrollments dropped sharply—to 92,128 students. The decline continued through 1978-79, but at a much slower rate—to a low of 90,985. Since that time, enrollments have increased slightly but steadily. See, Malen (Anderson), op. cit., p. 85.

[28] Minneapolis Tribune, (January 28, 1971), p. 2.

[29] G. Pinney, "Fewer Catholic Schools to Close," Minneapolis Tribune (May 15, 1971), pp. 1, 12A.

[30] Ibid.

[31] The distinction between "interests" as increased oppportunities to get what one wants or needs and "rights" as responses due someone by virtue of a just claim is made by Fred M. Frohock, Public Policy (Prentice-Hall, 1979). p. 249.

[32] Edelman, 1971, op. cit., p. 2.

[33] Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Edler, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building Second Edition (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), p. 132.

[34] For a description of Minnesota's political culture, see Tim L. Mazzoni Jr., State Policymaking for the Public Schools of Minnesota, prepared for the Education Governance Project (Ohio State University, April, 1974) pp. 18-26.

[35] Cobb and Edler, op. cit., p. 139.

[36] Edelman, 1964, op. cit., p. 137.

[37] Ibid., p. 123.

[38] See, Terry M. Moe, The Organization of Interests (University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp.113-167 and Robert Salisbury, "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13, (February, 1969), pp. 1-32.

[39] This argument is substantiated by a number of authors including, C. B. Muller, The Social and Political Consequences of Increased Public Support for Private Schools (Stanford, Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance, April, 1982).

[40] Edelman, 1964, op. cit., p. 31.

[41] Ibid., p. 116.

[42] James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (Harper, 1978), p. 12.

[43] Marjorie Randon Hershey and Darrell M. West, "Single-Issue Politics: Prolife Groups and the 1980 Senate Campaign" in Burdett J. Loomis and Allan J. Cigler (eds), Interest Group Politics (Congressional Quarterly, 1983), p. 34.

[44] A discussion of scope expansion strategies and their implications can be found in E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (Dryden, 1960), pp. 3-18.

[45] The term is Gamson's. Gamson, op.cit., p. 21.

[46] CEF Membership Brochure for the Minnesota Federation of the Citizens For Educational Freedom, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota.

[47] David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion Second Edition (Alfred A, Knopf, 1971), pp. 503-524.

[48] The metaphor is Hershey and West's. Hershey and West, op.cit., p. 35.

[49] Ibid., p. 42.

[50] C.D. Elder and R.W. Cobb, The Political Uses of Symbols (Longman, 1983) pp. 72-75.

[51] Hall, op.cit., p. 59.

[52] Hershey and West, op.cit., p. 35. Their assessment is consistent with Meadow's argument that "it is often possible to mobilize large numbers behind any symbol...even though individuals may respond to symbols for different reasons, the behavior that follows such responses may be uniform." Robert G. Meadow, Politics as Communication (Ablex Publishing, 1980), p. 34.

[53] Michael Kirst and Stephen Sommers, "Collective Action Among California Educational Interest Groups: A Logical Response to Proposition 13, " in Education and Urban Society, 13, No. 2, (1981), pp. 235-256.

[54] Milton Rakove, Don't Make No Waves...Don't Back No Loser (Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 9.

[55] Alan Rosenthal, Legislative Life (Harper & Row, 1981), p. 98.

[56] Edelman, op.cit., 1964, p. 38.

[57] Milbraith argues that "the sanction with the greatest impact on the public official is the decision of the voters." Lester Milbraith, "The Impact of Lobbying on Governmental Decisions," in Ira Sharkansky (ed), Policy Analysis in Political Science (Markham, 1970), p. 373.

[58] In their analysis of the effectiveness of threats in power relationships, Bacnarach and Lawler maintain, "Clear messages with clear contingencies leave less room for misunderstanding and probably appear more credible to the target." S. Bacnarach and E. Lawler, Power and Politics in Organizations (Jossey-Bass, 1980), p. 191.

[59] Cobb and Edler, op.cit., p. 142.

[60] Eugene Bardach, The Skill Factor in Politics, (University of California Press, 1972), p. 211. Rosenthal also notes that "Well-organized groups in the district can make even the less salient issue important, simply because they care intensly about something. A group with membership and support in a member's district has electoral potential. A visitation from group members who are also constitutents of a legislator can be most persuasive." Rosenthal, op.cit., p. 98.

[61] Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 33. Speaking more generally, Hayes maintains that "studies of lobbying have shown consistently that attempts to 'pressure' are counterproductive." Michale J. Hayes, "Interest Groups: Pluralism or Mass Society," Cigler and Loomis,(eds.), op. cit., p. 115.

[62] Loomis and Cigler write that while interest groups tend to overstate their impact, decisionmakers offer "equally vociferous claims of freedom from any outside influence." Cigler and Loomis, op. cit., p. 25. Acknowledging that one was "intimidated" is hardly a self-engrandizing admission.

[63] V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (Knopf, 1961), p. 522.

[64] See, for instance, Robert H. Salisbury, "The Dynamics of Reform: Charter Politics in St. Louis," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 5, (1961) pp. 269-275; Michael Margolis and Kevin Neary, "Pressure Politics Revisited," Policy Studies Journal,(Spring, 1980), pp. 698-716; and Pfeffer, op.cit., pp. 179-188.

[65] Cobb and Edler, op.cit., p. 38.

[66] In fiscal year 1976, the surplus was 379.8 million dollars, 16.8 percent of the general-fund budget. Minneapolis Star and Tribune, (May 31, 1982), p. 5A.

[67] By April of 1981, revenue shortages totaled over 500 million dollars and Minnesota was in the midst of its "worst fiscal crises in recent history." T. R. Peek and D. S. Wilson, Fiscal Constraints on Minnesota-Impacts and Policies: Economic Conditions and Changing Government Policies (Minneapolis: Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, January, 1983), p. 5.

[68] The pattern in Minnesota is also consistent with the Pfeffer's argument that "political language operates largely with and on symbolic outcomes..." Pfeffer, op.cit., p. 181.

[69] See, Tim L. Mazzoni and Betty Malen, "Mobilizing Constituency Pressure to Influence State Education Policy Making," forthcoming, Educational Administration Quarterly.

[70] Among others, Sroufe observes that "there appears to be an unusual number of interest groups who wish to elect decision makers on the basis of their stand on a single issue...their singlemindedness makes it difficult for the political system to find viable compromises in the public good." Gerald Sroufe, "Interest Groups and Public Policy, A Status Report," Education and Urban Society, 13, No. 2, (1981), p. 165.

[71] Paul E. Peterson, City Limits (University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 5.

[72] For an excellent discussion of the need to refine partial models and define their applicability to diverse issues and arenas, see Allison, op.cit., pp. 264-277 and Peterson, City Limits.